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Abstract — In the simplest terms, cloud computing
means storing and accessing data and programs over the
Internet instead of your computer's hard drive.
The cloud is just a metaphor for the Internet. Now a days
Cloud computing as an emerging technology trend is
expected to reshape the advances in information
technology. In a cost-efficient cloud environment, a user
can tolerate a certain degree of delay while retrieving
information from the cloud to reduce costs. In this paper,
i am address two fundamental issues in such an
environment: privacy and efficiency. My first review a
private keyword-based file retrieval scheme that was
originally proposed by Ostrovsky. Their scheme allows a
user to retrieve files of interest from an untrusted server
without leaking any information. The main drawback is
that it will cause a heavy querying overhead incurred on
the cloud and thus goes against the original intention of
cost efficiency. In this paper, present three efficient
information retrieval for ranked query (EIRQ) schemes
to reduce querying overhead incurred on the cloud. In
EIRQ, queries are classified into multiple ranks, where a
higher ranked query can retrieve a higher percentage of
matched files. A user can retrieve files on demand by
choosing queries of different ranks. This feature is useful
when there are a large number of matched files, but the
user only needs a small subset of them. Under different
parameter settings, extensive evaluations have been
conducted on both analytical models and on a real cloud
environment, in order to examine the effectiveness of
our schemes.
Keywords— Cloud computing, cost efficiency,
differential query services, privacy
I Introduction
The goal of cloud computing is to apply
traditional super-computing, or high-performance
computing power, normally used by military and
research facilities, to perform tens of trillions of
computations per second, in consumer-oriented
applications such as financial portfolios, to deliver
personalized  information, to provide data storage or to
power large, immersive computer games.Cloud
computing as an emerging technology is expected to
reshape information technology processes in the near
future [1]. Due to the overwhelming merits of cloud
computing, e.g., cost-effectiveness, flexibility and
scalability, more and more organizations choose to
outsource their data for sharing in the cloud. As a typical
cloud application, an organization subscribes the cloud
services and authorizes its staff to share files in the
cloud. Each file is described by a set of keywords, and
the staff, as authorized users, can retrieve files of their
interests by querying the cloud with certain keywords. In
such an environment, how to protect user privacy from
the cloud, which is a third party outside the security
boundary of the organization, becomes a key problem.
User privacy can be classified into search privacy and
access privacy [2]. Search privacy means that the cloud
knows nothing about what the user is searching for, and
access privacy means that the cloud knows nothing about
which files are returned to the user. When the files are
stored in the clear forms, a naive solution to protect user
privacy is for the user to request all of the files from the
cloud; this way, the cloud cannot know which files the
user is really interested in. While this does provide the
necessary privacy, the communication cost is high.
Private searching was proposed by Ostrovsky et al. [3],
[4] (referred to as the Ostrovsky scheme in this paper),
which allows a user to retrieve files of interest from an
untrusted server without leaking any information.
However, the Ostrovsky scheme has a high
computational cost, since it requires the cloud to process
the query (perform homomorphic encryption) on every
file in a collection. Otherwise, the cloud will learn that
certain files, without processing, are of no interest to the
user. It will quickly become a performance bottleneck
when the cloud needs to process thousands of queries
over a collection of hundreds of thousands of files argue
that subsequently proposed improvements, like [5], [6],
International Journal of Science Engineering and Advance Technology,




also have the same drawback. Commercial clouds follow
a pay-as-you-go model, where the customer is billed for
different operations such as bandwidth, CPU time, and
so on. Solutions that incur excessive computation and
communication costs are unacceptable to customers.
To make private searching applicable in a cloud
environment, our previous work [7] designed a cooperate
private searching protocol (COPS), where a proxy
server, called the aggregation and distribution layer
(ADL), is introduced between the users and the cloud.
The ADL deployed inside an organization has two main
functionalities: aggregating user queries and distributing
search results. Under the ADL, the computation cost
incurred on the cloud can be largely reduced, since the
cloud only needs to execute a combined query once, no
matter how many users are executing queries.
Furthermore, the communication cost incurred on the
cloud will also be reduced, since files shared by the users
need to be returned only once. Most importantly, by
using a series of secure functions, COPS can protect user
privacy from the ADL, the cloud, and other users.
In this paper, I am introducing a novel concept,
differential query services, to COPS, where the users are
allowed to personally decide how many matched files
will be returned. This is motivated by the fact that under
certain cases, there are a lot of files matching a user’s
query, but the user is interested in only a certain
percentage of matched files. To illustrate, let us assume
that Alice wants to retrieve 2 percent of the files that
contain keywords ‘‘A, B’’, and Bob wants to retrieve 20
percent of the files that contain keywords ‘‘A, C’’. The
cloud holds 1,000 files, where {F1; . . . ; F500} and
{F501; . . . ; F1000} are described by keywords ‘‘A, B’’
and ‘‘A, C’’, respectively. In the Ostrovsky scheme, the
cloud will have to return 2,000 files. In the COPS
scheme, the cloud will have to return 1,000 files. In our
scheme, the cloud only needs to return 200 files.
Therefore, by allowing the users to retrieve matched files
on demand, the bandwidth consumed in the cloud can be
largely reduced.
Motivated by this goal, propose a scheme, termed
Efficient Information retrieval for Ranked Query
(EIRQ), in which each user can choose the rank of his
query to determine the percentage of matched files to be
returned. The basic idea of EIRQ is to construct a
privacy-preserving mask matrix that allows the cloud to
filter out a certain percentage of matched files before
returning to the ADL. This is not a trivial work, since the
cloud needs to correctly filter out files according to the
rank of queries without knowing anything about user
privacy. Focusing on different design goals, provide two
extensions: the first extension emphasizes simplicity by
requiring the least amount of modifications from the
Ostrovsky scheme, and the second extension emphasizes
privacy by leaking the least amount of information to the
cloud.
Our key contributions are as follows:
1. Propose three EIRQ schemes based on the ADL
to provide a cost-efficient solution for private searching
in cloud computing.
2. The EIRQ schemes can protect user privacy
while providing a differential query service that allows
each user to retrieve matched files on demand.
3. Provide two solutions to adjust related
parameters; one is based on the Ostrovsky scheme, and
the other is based on Bloom filters.
4. Extensive experiments were performed using a
combination of simulations and real cloud deployments
to validate our schemes.
II Related Work
Our work aims to provide differential query services
while protecting user privacy from the cloud. Existing
research that is similar to ours can be found in the areas
of private searching [8], [9], [10], [11]. Unlike
searchable encryption [12], where the user conducts
searches on encrypted data, private searching performs
keyword-based searches on unencrypted data. Private
searching was first proposed in [3], [4], which allow a
server to filter streaming data without compromising
user privacy. Their solution requires the server to return
a buffer of size O(flog(f)) when f files match a user’s
query. Each file is associated with a survival rate, which
denotes the probability of this file being successfully
recovered by the user. Based on the Paillier
cryptosystem [13], the files that mismatch a query will
not survive in the buffer, but the matched files enjoy a
high survival rate.
Among various extensions, [5], [6] further reduced the
communication cost from O(f log(f) to O(f) by solving a
set of linear equations to recover f matched files.
However, their scheme requires the decryption of one
more buffer, thus the computation cost is higher than the
Ostrovsky scheme. Reference [8] presented an efficient
decoding mechanism which allows the recovery of files
that collide in a buffer position. Reference [9] proposed a
recursive extraction mechanism, which requires a buffer
of size O(f) when f files match a user’s query. Reference
[10] proposed two new communication-optimal
constructions; one uses Reed-Solomon codes and allows
for a zero-error, and the other is based on irregular
LDPC codes and allows for lower computation cost at
the server. The above private searching schemes only
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support searching for OR of keywords or AND of two
sets of keywords. Reference [11] extended the types of
queries to support disjunctive normal forms (DNF) of
keywords. The main drawback of existing private
searching schemes is that both the computation and
communication costs grow linearly with the number of
users executing queries. Thus, when applying these
schemes to a large-scale cloud environment, querying
costs will be extensive.
III System Model
The system mainly consists of three entities:1 the
aggregation and distribution layer (ADL), many users,
and the cloud, as shown in Fig. 1. For ease of
explanation, only use a single ADL in this paper, but
multiple ADLs can be deployed as necessary. An ADL is
deployed in an organization that authorizes its staff to
share data in the cloud. The staff members, as the
authorized users, send their queries to the ADL, which
will aggregate user queries and send a combined query
to the cloud. Then, the cloud processes the combined
query on the file collection and returns a buffer that
contains all of matched files to the ADL, which will
distribute the search results to each user. To aggregate
sufficient queries, the organization may require the ADL
to wait for a period of time before running our schemes,
which may incur a certain querying delay. To further
reduce the communication cost, a differential query
service is provided by allowing each user to retrieve
matched files on demand. Specifically, a user selects a
Particular rank for his query to determine the percentage
of matched files to be returned. This feature is useful
when there are a lot of files that match a user’s query,
but the user only needs a small subset of them.
Fig. 1: System model.
Overview of the Ostrovsky Scheme
The Paillier cryptosystem allows the performance of
certain operations, such as multiplication and
exponentiation, on ciphertext directly. Given the
resultant ciphertext, the user can obtain the
corresponding plaintext that processes addition and
multiplication operations.
The Ostrovsky scheme consists of three algorithms, the
working process of which is shown in Fig. 2(a). Two
assumptions are used in their scheme: first, a dictionary
that consists of the universal keywords is assumed to be
publicly available; second, the users are assumed to have
the ability to estimate the number of files that match
their queries. To better illustrate its working process,
provide an example in the supplementary file available
online
Step.1 The user runs the Generate Query algorithm to
send an encrypted query to the cloud. The query is a bit
string encrypted under the user’s public key, where each
bit is an encryption of 1, if the keyword in the dictionary
is chosen; otherwise, it is an encryption of 0.
Step.2 The cloud runs the Private Search algorithm to
return an encrypted buffer to the user. Generally
speaking, the cloud processes the encrypted query on
every file in the collection to generate an encrypted c-e
pair, and maps it to multiple entries of an encrypted
buffer. For file Fj, the corresponding c-e pair, denoted as
(cj ,ej)  is generated as follows: the bits in query Q
corresponding to keywords in Fj are multiplied. The
mapping operation will be performed gamma times.
After mapping all pairs to the buffer, each buffer entry
has one of the three statuses: survival, collision, and
mismatch. If only one matched file is mapped, the entry
state is survival; if more than one matched file is
mapped, the entry state is collision; if no matched files
aremapped, the entry state is mismatch.
Step.3 The user runs the File Recover algorithm to
recover files. The user decrypts the buffer, entry by
entry, to obtain the plaintext c-e pairs. For the entries in
the survival state, file content can be recovered by
dividing the plaintext e value by the plaintext c value.
The security of the Ostrovsky scheme derives from the
semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem. The key
technique of their scheme is that the files mismatching a
user’s query are processed to encrypted 0s, which have
no impact on the matched files, even if they are mapped
in the same entry. Thus, the buffer size only depends on
the number of matched files, which is much smaller than
the number of files stored in the cloud.
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Fig. 2: Working process. (a) Ostrovsky scheme. (b)
EIRQ- Efficient scheme.
The basic idea of EIQR-Efficient is to construct a
privacy-preserving mask matrix with which the cloud
can filter out a certain percentage of matched files before
mapping them to a buffer. As proven in the Ostrovsky
scheme, the file survival rate is determined by the buffer
size β and mapping times γ. therefore, the basic idea of
two extensions is that, for each rank i € { 0,. . . , r}, the
ADL adjusts the buffer size _i and the mapping times _i
to make the file survival rate q i approach 1 – i/r.
EIRQ-Efficient Scheme
Firstly, should determine the relationship between query
rank and the percentage of matched files to be returned.
Suppose that queries are classified into 0 ~ r ranks.
Rank-0 queries have the highest rank and Rank-r queries
have the lowest rank. In this paper, simply determine this
relationship by allowing Rank-i queries to retrieve 1 – i/r
percent of matched files. Therefore, Rank-0 queries can
retrieve 100 percent of matched files, and Rank-r queries
cannot retrieve any files.
Secondly, should determine which matched files will be
returned and which will not. In this paper, I am simply
determine the probability of a file being returned by the
highest rank of queries matching this file. Specifically,
first rank each keyword by the highest rank of queries
choosing it, and then rank each file by the highest rank
of its keywords. If the file rank is i, then the probability
of being filtered out is i=r. Therefore, Rank-0 files will
be mapped into a buffer with probability 1, and Rank-r
files will not be mapped at all. Since unneeded files have
been filtered out before mapping, the mapped files
should survive in the buffer with probability 1.
Since algorithms QueryGen and ResultDivide are easily
understood, I am only provided the details of algorithms
Matrix- Construct and File Filter in Alg. 1.
Step 1. The user runs the QueryGen algorithm to send
keywords and the rank of the query to the ADL. Since
the ADL is assumed to be a trusted third party, this query
will be sent without encryption.
Step 2. After aggregating enough user queries, the ADL
runs the Matrix Construct algorithm to send a mask
matrix to the cloud. The mask matrix M is a d-row and r-
column matrix, where d is the number of keywords in
the dictionary, and r is the lowest query rank. Let M[I, j]
denote the element in the i-th row and the j-th column,
and let l be the highest rank of queries that choose the i
th keyword Dic[i] in the dictionary. M is constructed as
follows: for the i-th row of M that corresponds to Dic[i],
M[i,1] . . .;M[i, r-l] are set to 1, and M[I, r-l+1] . . .M[i,
r] are set to 0, then each element is encrypted under the
ADL’s public key pk. For the rows that correspond to
Rank-l keywords, the ADL sets the first r – l elements,
rather than random r _ l elements, to 1. The reason is to
ensure that, given any Rank-l file Fj, when my choose a
random number k, the probability of all of the k-th
elements of the rows that correspond Fj’s keywords
being 0 is l=r, which is determined by the highest rank of
Fj’s keywords.
Step 3. The cloud runs the File Filter algorithm to return
a buffer that contains a certain percentage of matched
files to the ADL. Specifically, the cloud multiplies the k-
th elements of the rows that correspond to Fj’s keywords
together to form cj, where k ¼ j mod r. Then, it powers
jFjj to cj to obtain ej, and maps the c-e pair into multiple
entries of a buffer, as in the Ostrovsky scheme. Note
that, with Step 2, i can make sure that, for a Rank-l file
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Fj, the probability of cj being 0 is l=r, and thus the
probability of Fj being filtered out is l=r.
Step 4. The ADL runs the ResultDivide algorithm to
distribute search results to each user. File contents are
recovered as the File Recover algorithm in the Ostrovsky
scheme. To allow the ADL to distribute files correctly, i
require the cloud to attach keywords to the file content.
Thus, the ADL can find out all of the files that match
users’ queries by executing keyword searches.
Access Privacy
In the three schemes, the cloud processes the encrypted
query on each file in a collection, and maps the
processing result into a buffer, which is encrypted with
the ADL’s public key. The cloud conducts this process
for all files in the same way. Therefore, the cloud cannot
know which files are actually returned from the
encrypted buffer.
Rank Privacy
In EIRQ-Simple, the messages from the ADL to the
cloud are r encrypted queries, the buffer size, and the
mapping times, where r is the information, which leak
more than [3]. Given r, the cloud only knows the number
of queryranks without knowing how many users is in
each rank, nor which users are in which ranks.
Therefore, EIRQSimple can protect the basic level of
rank privacy for a user. In EIRQ-Privacy, the message
from the ADL to the cloud is a d-row and m-column
mask matrix, where d is the number of keywords in the
dictionary, and m =max γi is the maximal value of
mapping times. Therefore, EIRQ-Efficient can protect
the basic level of rank privacy for a user. I will evaluate
the consumed energy overhead in the cloud to verify the
effectiveness of our schemes. I use No Rank to denote
unranked queries under the ADL. The summary of the
experiment parameters are shown in below Table.
.
Table 1: TOWARDS DIFFERENTIAL QUERY
SERVICES IN COST-EFFICIENT CLOUDS
IV Conclusion
In this paper, proposed three EIRQ schemes based on an
ADL to provide differential query services while
protecting user privacy. By using our schemes, a user
can retrieve different percentages of matched files by
specifying queries of different ranks. By further reducing
the communication cost incurred on the cloud, the EIRQ
schemes make the private searching technique more
applicable to a cost-efficient cloud environment.
However, in the EIRQ schemes, simply determine the
rank of each file by the highest rank of queries it
matches. For our future work, will try to design a
flexible ranking mechanism for the EIRQ schemes.
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